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IN

RELATION TO

"IMPLIED CONSENT" PROVISIONS OF CERTAIN
MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTES
By 0. 0. MyHnR*

F oR upwards

of a half century the mechanics' lien statutes of
Minnesota and a few other states have included a provision
which establishes liens by means of a presumption that an owner
authorized the improvement. Minn. Stat. (1945) § 514.06; Cal.
Code of Civ. Proc. (1941) § 1192; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929)
§ 3743; N. Mex. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 63.210; Ore. Comp. Laws
Ann. (1940) 67.104; S. Dak. Code (1939) § 39.0706. The particular provision in question charges the owner's interest in the
improved land with liens for unpaid labor and materials if the
owner knew that it was being improved and failed to give notice
to claimants (contributors), at the time and in the exact manner
prescribed, that he had not authorized the improvement.
The constitutional aspects of this section have had some consideration by the Courts of California and Oregon, but argumentative support of the law has been most extensive in the decisions of
the Minnesota Court. A challenge of the law at this late date means,
naturally, a challenge also of the judicial decisions supporting it,
although fully appreciating that the ingenious language of the
questioned statute presents a veritable legal riddle. It is proposed,
therefore, to deal with the Minnesota Statute and decisions rather
exhaustively, since it does not appear that this type of statute has
vet been tested by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States.
That which evidently has dominated the juristic, as well as
the legislative minds, and obscured the real flaw of the act, is the
*Member of the Minnesota Bar, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:559

zeal to prevent a landowner from reaping the fruit of another's
contribution without paying for it. The flaw in the act, in final
analysis, consists in the undue and prejudicial advantage given
contributors of labor and material in making proof of facts necessary to sustain a lien. To illustrate: Assume that A, owning land
in common with B, "authorized" C to make improvement X on
the land. Upon proof by C of the "authorization," the contract between A and C, express or implied, supports the lien upon A's interest in the land in favor of C, for unpaid labor and materials.
However, B's interest cannot be charged if B was not a party to
the authorization. The Statute, however, compels a court to find
"authorization" by B, if at any stage in the construction of X, B
knew of its progress. This consequence B can escape only if he
shows the giving of notice at the time, in the form, and in the
manner prescribed by the Statute; and the onus of such proof is on
B. By the same token, though B may have given C actual notice
of his non-responsibility for X in form, time or manner different
from these prescriptions, or though it may have been impossible
for B to give notice in conformity with the Statute, such facts are
made inadmissible in evidence. Thus the statutory presumption
against B is, under all circumstances (absent, the statutory notice)
conclusive; although there be, on the one hand, plain facts refuting the presumption, or there be, on the other hand, only the sole
proof of B's knowledge. It should be observed also that the "authorization" by A imposes upon him personal liability for C's claim;
not so-under the statute-in the case of B. Nevertheless B's property is "taken" under the pretext of a liability ex contractu which
naturally follows the finding of "authorization" by B, which the
evidence will not sustain.
The Statute manifestly is in the nature of a rule of evidence.
However, as we shall see, courts have been prone to introduce in
their discussions additional concepts as legal props for the Statute.
Evaluation of these, and of technical terms involved, in terms of
fundamental principles, plus some historical considerations, seem
inescapable if the web of confused thought on the statute is to be
disentangled. An adequate treatment of the subject must, then,
embrace considerably more than the sole question of the statute as
a rule of evidence, however disproportionate this may appear to
the real issue presented by this brief statute.
Coming now to some general aspects of the lien laws, it may
safely be said that in absence of statute one cannot make any
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direct claim on real property-to the improvement of which he
may have contributed--on the sole ground that he has added value
to it. The lien statutes, however, invariably give a lien to a contributor to an improvement, where the owner of the land has contracted for it with the contributor; and, generally, where the owner
has authorized the claimant to furnish it, either by request or direction. It will be recognized in such case that liens are founded on
contracts, either express or implied. Some statutes contain an
additional ground for liens, namely: the "consent" of the owner,
or his "knowledge and consent," to the improvement. Since, in
contracting, the law becomes a part of the contract, the owner's
consent to the lien is implied in law and in fact unless the contract
expressly provides that the law is excluded. But this is on the presumption that everyone knows the law; since ignorance of the
law is not excusable. Since consent is of the essence of contract,
the owner's "consent" to the improvement may also reasonably be
said to imply the consent to the encumbrance, as in the case of a
contract. Consequently, statutes granting liens based on contract,
or on request by the owner for, or on his consent to, the improvement, are recognized as compatible with the "due process" clauses;
because the owner in such cases, by virtue of the meeting of his
mind with that of the contributor on subject matter to which existing statutes appertain, consents to the lien. If, on the other hand,
due consideration to the owner's consent to the lien is not given in
such legislation, it would be invalid; because the legislature cannot
take the property of one and give it to another. This power is reserved to the judiciary to be accomplished through "due process
of law." However clear this would seem to be, a review of the
decisions involving this type of legislation discloses that legislatures
have over-stepped constitutional limitations from time to time.
In the several jurisdictions alluded to at the outset, the foundation for a lien is enlarged by including in the statutes a provision
through which the "authority" of an owner is implied. In such
case (courts failing to distinguish "consent" from "authority") the
consent to the encumbrance is thought to follow by implication,
from an "authorization" of the improvement by an owner; which
in turn is merely presumed from proof of certain specified but
limited facts. Our present inquiry is, accordingly, concerned specifically with this type of provision; and, in particular, Sec. 514.06,
1945 Stats. Minn., being Sec. 8495, Mason's Minn. Statute 1927
(Sec. 3509 R. L. Minn.) ; the pertinent part of vhich is hereinafter set out.
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All Courts seem to be agreed on the principle, inhering in the
foregoing, that mechanic liens are encumbrances which must ultimately rest upon the consent of the owner of the land improved and
charged unless an estoppel theory as adopted in California is an
exception. Thus the voluntary act of an owner, in being a party to
the scheme of improvement, so as to be chargeable with an agreement, implies his consent to the liens according to the lien statute,
as a matter of fact.
"It cannot be questioned that by statute a lien may be given in
favor of builders, laborers, and material men contracting, subsequently to the enactment of the statute, directly with the owner
of the property. Such a lien is not a charge imposed upon the
property of the owner by legislative enactment, without his consent
and without process of law. The parties * * * are presumed to contract with reference to statute; and unless the parties by express
agreement exclude such presumption, the statutory provisions are
annexed to the contract expressly made, and are to be construed as
a part of it."'"* * * We cannot assume that the legislature intended what it
had no power to do-to impose liens on the owner's property without any reference to his consent . .. "2
While these decisions refer to statutes basing liens upon express
contracts, statutes may, and generally do, base liens upon implied
contracts arising, for example, where improvements are made "at
the instance or authority" of the owner. But reason dictates that
any recession from an express contract as the basis of a lien, makes
less apparent the owner's consent to the encumbrance, which in turn
increases the necessity of weighing the mandates of the constitutional "due process" clauses.
Courts have frequently pointed out that there is no essential
difference between implied and express contracts. The distinction
rests in the mode of proof. In an express contract the promise to
pay is expressed; whereas in an implied contract the promise to
pay is supplied on proof of other elements of a contract. In both
cases "there must be that connection, mutuality of will, and interaction of parties generally expressed, though not very clearly, by
the term 'privity.' " Implied contracts may, in reference to an
improvement, arise in two ways: one, out of the request by the
1. Bohn et al. v. McCarthy et al., (1881) 29 Minn. 23, 11 N. W. 127. See
also O'Neil v. St. Olaf's School, (1880) 26 Minn. 329; Blauvelt v. Woolworth, (1865) 31 N. Y. 285; Laird v. Moonan, (1884) 32 Minn. 358, 20
N. W. 354.
2. O'Neil z. Anderson, (1880) 26 Minn. 329, 4 N. W. 47.
3. Wood v. Ayres, (1878) 39 Mich. 345, 33 Am. Rep. 396; Saunders v.
Saunders, (1897) 90 Me. 284, 38 A. 172.
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land owner; the other, by his acceptance of what is done, being
done, or proposed to be done, by another. Hence, where something
of value is furnished by one, to another, at the latter's request, the
law implies the promise of the latter to pay for it, as a matter of fact.
But if one furnishes something of value, without request by another, and the latter merely accepts it, the promise to pay arises as
a presumption of fact. In the first instance, preponderance of proof
is necessary to overcome the implied promise to pay; whereas, in
the second instance, only slight proof will overcome the presumption of the promise to pay. 4 Liens, then, are in effect security for
a promise to pay analogous to mortgages. It is, accordingly, when
lien questions transcend this analogy, that difficulties arise.
There is another class of obligation, sometimes called an implied contract, but which is strictly a legal fiction and properly
termed a quasi, or constructive, contract. While it has no application
to the lien law, its nature is worth noting for reasons to be considered later on. The Supreme Court of Michigan, for example,
treats aptly this type of obligation in the following language:
"In order to afford the remedy demanded by exact justice and
adjust such remedy to a cause of action, the law sometimes indulges
in the fiction of a quasi or constructive contract, with an implied
obligation to pay for benefits received. The courts, however, employ
the fiction with caution, and will never permit it in cases where
contracts, implied in fact, must be established, or substitute one
promisor or debtor for another."5
A further discussion of this class of obligations is found in
Vol. 17 C. J. S. 322, Sec. 6; wherein quasi or constructive contracts are said to be:
"obligations imposed or created by law without regard to the
consent of the party bound, on the ground that they are dictated by
reason and justice * * * the obligation arises not from consent, as
in the case of true contracts, but from the law or natural equity
* **.
So, when the party to be bound is under a legal obligation to
perform the duty from which his promise is inferred the law may
infer a promise even as against his intention. In order that a contract may be implied in law from the wrong of a party, it must have
been committed with the intention of benefiting his own estate."
(Italics supplied) 6
4.

Wojahn v. Union Natl Bank of Oshkosh, (1911)

144 Wis. 646, 129

N. W. 1068.
5. Cascoden v. Magryta, (1911) 247 Mich. 267, 225 N. W. 511.

6. This authority cites instances of quasi or constructive contracts as
those-(1) in which money is improperly received-(2) or where money
has been improperly paid-(3) cases of account stated-(4) judgment on
which an action of assumpsit or debt may be maintained-(5) cases in which
an obligation to pay money is imposed by statute-(6) cases where a person
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Because of the great significance of the word in relation to the
theory of liens, we pass now to a consideration of "consent" as a
statutory basis for liens. The word has been before various courts,
and has been construed to the extent that there can be little doubt
about its nature. In Valenti v. New York Theatre Co., 7 it was
stated that under lien law,
"the owner's 'consent' implies his actual consent that the improvement shall be made, and his mere general consent that the
lessee at his own expense may make repairs is insufficient; nor
do his expressions of satisfaction with the work, as to which he
exercised no supervision, imply his consent." In Avery v. Smith
the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed that "the mere fact
that the * * * owner knew of the contract, and that the work was
going on, does not constitute 'consent' within the statute; there
being no 'consent' unless there is an implied agreement on the part
of the owner to pay for the work or material ....

Consent means

unity of opinion; the accord of minds; to think alike; to be of one
mind. Consent involves the presence of two or more persons, for
without at least two persons there cannot be a unity of opinion
or an accord of mind or any thinking alike." "The words 'consent
of the owner' are used in the statute as something different from an
agreement with the owner, and, while it may be urged that they do
not require such a meeting of the minds of the parties as would
be essential to the making of a contract, there must be enough of a
meeting of their minds to make it fairly apparent that they intended
the same thing in the same sense. It cannot be supposed that the
statute was designed to be made a cover for entrapping a party into
seeming consent when there was no real one." That consent under
lien statutes cannot be based merely on an owner's passive acquiescence in the making of improvements has been repeatedly
stated.9
The hail insurance law of North Dakota embodies a lien provision. By the statutes of 1919 and 1921, the consent of an owner
to the lien for hail taxes originated in his knowledge of the law
and its operation; but, if an owner desired insurance, the primary
duty devolved upon him, or the tenant, to invoke the statute
by wrongfully appropriating property to his own use becomes liable to pay
the owner the reasonable value thereof-(7) cases in which a person fails
to deliver specific property and becomes liable for the money value thereof(8) cases where a person wrongfully compels another to render him valuable
services-(9) cases where one man has obtained money from another by
oppression, extortion, or deceit-(10) or thru the commission of trespass(11) cases in which necessities are supplied to a person who by reason of
disability cannot himself contract, i.e., minors, insane persons-(12) cases
where a husband recovers funeral expenses from estate of his wife, etc.
7. (1917) 166 N. Y. S. 76, 77.
8. (1921) 96 Conn. 223, 113 A. 313.
9. C. Wilson's Plumbing Shop on Wheels v. Trustees of Dartmouth
College, (1938) 6 N. Y. S. 2d 671; Perryman v. State, (1940) 63 Ga. App.
819, 12 S. E. 2d 388; Nat'l Wallpaper Co. v. Pire, (1899) 55 N. Y. S. 1009.
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through the affirmative act of filing an affidavit relating to acreage
and crops.' 0 However, when that statute was re-enacted in 1933,
hail insurance, under the new provisions, "would be granted only
upon the written application, or pursuant to the consent of the
owner of the land," and the resulting lien would "be prior and
superior to all mortgages, liens and judgments executed subsequent to the approval of this act."" The hail insurance statute was
justified on the ground that "the business of insurance itself is impressed with a public interest so as to justify legislative regulation
to an extent that may not be justified in many other types of business."' 2 In Federal Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Falk' it is pointed out
that the authorities, including the Supreme Court of the Urtited
States, have approved statutes giving liens on the basis of "request"
or "consent," the court stating that "where any reasonable grounds
exist for so doing, the legislative assembly may provide that a person, who at the request or with the consent of another has rendered
service, furnished materials or supplies, shall have a lien on some
property or thing of value belonging to the person at whose request
or consent, and for whose benefit the services were performed or
materials or supplies furnished. And where such statute operates
prospectively, it is not in violation of the 'due process' or 'equal
protection of the law' clauses of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the Uilited States." (Italics supplied.)
In Clark v. North' 4 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin made it
clear that "consent," as a ground for a lien, required something
more than mere knowledge and acquiescence, or silence; that it has
its origin in the proposal to do, or the doing of something by one
party, with which another (owner) is in deliberate and voluntary
accord. In that case the owner knew of the well drilling, and consented to it, on condition, however, that another (optionee) was to
pay for it. The court said that: "such conditional consent was in
effect a protest against the construction of the well at the expense
of the defendant (owner) in whole or in part." The plaintiff
(claimant) proceeding thereafter in effect waived any supposed
lien. This view is also well expressed in the following language
in the opinion in DeKlyn v. Gould :'5
10. Bassen v. Olsness, Insurance Com'r, (1921) 48 N. D. 68, 182 N. W.

1013; Davis v. McLean County, (1925) 52 N. D. 857, 204 N. W. 459.
11. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Falk, (1936) 67 N. D. 154, 270
N. W. 885.
12. State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, (1916) 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561.
13. See footnote 11.
14. (1907) 131 Wis. 599, 111 N. W. 681.
15. (1901) 165 N. Y. 287, 59 N. E. 95.
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"Mere acquiescence in the erection or alteration, with knowledge, is not sufficient evidence of the consent which the statute requires. There must be something more. Consent is not a vacant or
neutral attitude in respect of a question of such material interest
to the property owner. It is affirmative in its nature. It should not
be implied contrary to the obvious truth, unless upon equitable
principles the owner should be estopped from asserting the truth."
(Italics supplied.)
The one thing which all of these authorities appear to be especially concerned with is that positive and affirmative behavior on
the part of the owner which signals to a claimant that he has "a
grant of the right" to make the improvement; and the right, as a
consequence, to charge the property with a lien. Thus, it appears
that "consent" is the most tenuous vehicle capable, as a matter of
substantive law, of conveying an owner's consent to a lien, which
may constitutionally be prescribed. This is but to say: that unless
there is at least "consent" to the improvement, there is no rational
basis for consent to the incumbrance. Certainly "consent" as a
fact, does not result from a law which may coerce or entrap an owner into seeming consent. Moreover, if a prescription or formula by
the legislature, short of "consent"-such as "knowledge" and "passive acquiescence," or "silence"-is made the basis for the "taking
of property," a denial of due process is involved. A statute arbitrarily assuming such character and effect wohld be void on its
face. There is no basis in reason or natural justice for any assumption on the part of a stranger or trespasser that his entry and activities upon another's land, without request of the owner, is going to
have such approval and acceptance that the owner will either pay
or consent to any lien. Reason dictates that he must defer to the
rights of the owner in the land, and cannot make assumptions which
he knows are apt to be contrary to the interests of the owner.
From the foregoing it becomes clear that "consent," in respect
of the mechanic lien laws, is, and apparently must be, equivalent
to an implied contract in that the essential elements of "consent"
constitute a pri u facie implied contract. This in turn necessarily
implies personal liability. The statute, however, by its languageas we will see presently-adroitly excludes the personal liability
which logically follows the finding made mandatory by the statute:
i.e. of "authorization," in deference to the proof. The thought apparently is to ameliorate the consequences of the finding by limiting
them to a lien on the owner's property. In fine, the statute creates
the illusion of a debt as a justification for the "taking of property."
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STATUTE

The lien statutes of Minnesota now in force were preceded by
Chapter 170, G. L. 1887, which had a lease on life for over ten
years. The framers of the old act went so far afield as to provide
that "consent" should be conclusively proven by failure of any
owner to bring suit in iojunction against the contributors:
(Sec. 5) "The fact that the person performing labor or furnishing material was not enjoined by law by the person in whom the
title was vested at the time such labor was performed or material
furnished, shall be conclusive evidence that it was with and by the
consent of the owner that such labor was performed and material
furnished."
In the ten years following enactment of the older lien act, the
supreme court had several occasions to examine it piecemeal. All
of it was eventually challenged as being unconstitutional, and the
court invalidated the entire act in Meyer v,.Berlandi,16 justice
Mitchell writing the opinion. Section 5 of this act came in for
specific consideration, and the court said in respect of it, as follows:
"As liens are an incumbrance upon the owner's property, it is
fundamental that they can only be created by his consent or authority. No man can be deprived of his property without his consent or
due process of law."
Further:
"The legislature may doubtless establish rules of evidence, but
to' enact a law making evidence conclusive which is not so necessarily in and of itself, and thus preclude a party from showing the
truth, would be nothing short of confiscation of property, and a
destruction of vested rights without due process of law."
This Berlandi case seems to state the fundamental prerequisites
of a statute of that nature concisely and clearly. It is doubtful,
however, that what the court said above, in this case, was ever subsequently fully understood and applied. A new mechanic lien
statute was enacted shortly after the Berlandi decision, being Chap.
200, G. L. of 1889. Section 5 of that Act (a remolding and recasting of Sec. 5 of the former act) was presumably an attempt to conform to the Berlandi decision. The ulterior purpose of the authors
in contriving an advantage to claimants was, however, not abandoned. The remolded provision (Sec. 5) in substance provided, and
read, in part:
"Every house (etc.) *** mentioned in Secs. (1) and (2) of
this act * * * erected, constructed, altered, removed to or repaired
upon any land, with the knowledge of the owner of such land, or of
any person having or claiming an interest therein otherwise than as
16. (1888) 39 Minn. 438, 40 N. W. 513.
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a bona fide prior mortgagee, incumbrancer or lienor, shall be held
to have been erected * * * at the instance of such owner or person,
so far only as to subject his interest to a lien therefor, as in this
section provided, and such interest so owned or claimed, shall be
subject to any lien given by the provisions of this act, unless such
owner or person shall, within five days after he shall have obtained knowledge of the erection, construction, alteration, removal
or repair aforesaid, give notice that his interests shall not be subject to any lien for the same by serving a written or printed notice
to that effect personally upon all persons performing labor or furnishing skill, material or machinery therefor, or shall, within five
days after he shall have obtained the knowledge aforesaid, or
knowledge of the intended erection, construction, alteration, removal or repair aforesaid, give such notice as aforesaid by posting
and keeping posted a written or printed notice to the effect aforesaid in some conspicuous place upon said land or upon the buildings
or other improvements situate thereon * * *."

A revised statute was subsequently enacted in which the above
provision was condensed and incorporated in Section 3509 R. L.,
from which comes the present statute (Sec. 514.06, Minn. Stats.
1945), the pertinent part of which reads, as follows:
"*

* * When improvements are made by one person upon the

land of another, all persons interested therein otherwise than as
bona fide prior incumbrancers or lienors shall be deemed to have
authorized such improvements, insofar as to subject their interests
to liens therefor. But any person who has not authorized the same
may protect his interest from such liens by serving upon the persons doing work or otherwise contributing to such improvement
within five days after knowledge thereof, written notice that the
improvement is not being made at his instance, or by posting like
notice, and keeping the same posted, in a conspicuous place on the
premises. * *

*"

It will be seen that in this revision, the provision for posting of
notice upon learning of the intended improvement, and prior to
actual commencement thereof, has been eliminated. Some change
also was made in respect of the contents of the notice. Sec. 5 of
said Chap. 200, required the notice to state that the owner's "interest shall not be subject to any lien"; whereas the revision requires
the owner to state, "that the improvement is not being made at his
instance." Under the older provision the owner seems to be permitted to assent to the improvement, but to make an effective denial
of a lien on his interest; while under the revision he still assents
to the improvement, but denies he was instrumental in procuring it.
Thus, under the older provision he could possibly have "consented"
to it, but still avoid the lien by repudiating it; whereas under the
revision, while assenting, he simply denies any request on his part
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-although this the prospective lienor already knows, in most cases
at least. It is significant that "consent" to the improvement, by
itself, is not made a ground for a lien, either in this particular
section, or any other section of the statute; the only grounds for a
lien being the owner's "contract," his "instance," or "authority."
The Minnesota court, in any event, has indicated that the revision
has not radically modified the legal effect of the 1889 statute.17
DECISIONS UNDER TH9E PRESENT MINNESOTA STATUTE

The redrafted statute (Chap. 200, G.L. 1889) came first up
for consideration by the Minnesota Supreme Court in John Martin
Lumber Co. v. Howard."' Speaking of Section 5 of this statute, the
court said:
"By the provisions of Sec. 5 there has been established a rde
of evidence* * * in the nature of an equitable estoppel, and under
which all interested parties, with certain exceptions, are required
to speak out when advised of the fact that improvements are being
made upon real property. If, with knowledge of the fact, they remain silent,' acquiescence and consent to the making of the improvements and to the consequences in case labor and materials are
not paid for are conclusively presumed under the statute." (Italics
supplied.)
This forthrightness seems to have called for some reservation
by the court, possibly because of some argument in the case, since
it goes on to say:
"In conclusion we will say that, whatever implied limitations
there may be to the general language of Sec. 5, it is clear that it
applied to all cases where the owner, knowing that improvements
are being made on his property, keeps silent, when fairness and
common honesty require him to speak." (Italics supplied.)
On the next occasion for consideration of this statute, the court
seems to have recognized that an equitable estoppel is not fully accounted for in the John Martin Lumber Co. case. Apparently this
tempted the court to draw upon the statute for the concept of
"duty" devolving upon the owner to disclaim authority for an
improvement, for the purpose of justifying its "equitable estoppel"
hypothesis, or the application of the legal fiction of quasi-contract.
Witness the case of Wheaton v. Berg,'9 wherein the court says:
"Hence the statute, in effect, makes it the duty of the owner,
who knows of the improvement being made, to give the prescribed
notice if he would avoid the inference that it is done with his con17. See Wallinder v. Weiss, (1912) 119 Minn. 412, 138 N. W. 417.
18. (1892) 49 Minn. 404, 52 N. W. 34.
19. (1892) 50 Minn. 525, 52 N. W. 926.
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sent. From the neglect of the duty created by statute the inference
follows ** *."
But the embers from "implied limitations," in the preceding John
Martin Lumber Co. case, have now been fanned into faint incandescence, for the court promptly proceeds:
"* * * But it would seem to be impossible to construe this provision as making the mere neglect to give the specified notice conclusive upon the landowner in all cases.
"It is beyond the power of the legislature to subject one's property to such a liability by reason merely of his failure to perform a
specified act arbitrarily prescribed by statute, if the circumstances
are such as to render performanceimpossible.
"But some reasonable effect should be given to the statute if it be
possible; and this may be done by construing the statutory presumption, which springs from the failure to give notice, as being of a
primTa facie nature rather than conclusive.
"As the statute was obviously intended to establish a rule of
evidence, and as it cannot be sustained if the statutory presumption
is to be construed as conclusive, but may be if it has the qualified
effect which we have suggested we conclude that it must be so
construed." (Italics supplied.)
From this it appears that the court regards the reasonable possibility for an owner to disaffirm authorization in the arbitrarily
prescribed manner, as the equivalent of "due process."
It is interesting to note that Justice Mitchell, who wrote the
opinion holding the original act invalid, in Meyer v. Berlandi 20
dissented in the Wheaton v. Berg case, particularly with reference
to the application of that section to vendors under land contracts.
While this point is not germane to the present discussion, it may
be noted that vendors were involved with that section, as they are
under the revised version, which now provides:
"When land issold under an executory contract requiring the
vendee to improve the same, and such contract is forfeited or surrendered after liens have attached by reason of such improvements, the title of the vendor shall be subject thereto; but he shall
not be personally liable if the contract was made in good faith."
The question arises, then, as to whether a vendor, in absence of
his requiring an improvement, is subject to the section as an owner.
The Minnesota court, entirely aside from this provision, has held,
. 2starting at least with Fauserv. McElroy,
that a vendor in a land
contract is an owner, and not an encumbrancer or lienor, and,
therefore, subject to the "duty" of giving notice. But it will be
seen, from Wagner v. Wagner,22 that under an identical statute
20. (1888) 39 Minn.438, 40 N. W. 513, discussed at p. 567.
21. (1923) 157 Minn. 116, 195 N. W. 786.
22. (1924) 47 S. D. 104, 196 N. W. 499.
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of South Dakota the supreme court of that state has held that
such vendor is a lienor, and not an owner, and is thus excepted
from the operation of the statute. This ruling subsists despite the
recognition that the South Dakota statutes are an adoption of the
Minnesota lien statutes.2-3 Whatever the interest of a vendor may
be denominated in Minnesota, it has uniformly been held by the
Minnesota court that he holds the legal title in trust or as security
for payment of purchase price by vendee; and that in effect the
contract may be foreclosed in an equitable action for specific performance ;24 that, while it is not favored, a vendor's lien exists
under Minnesota law ;2' and that the vendor may bring an action,
in case of default, to enforce a lien against the property for the
unpaid purchase price .2 So, to the extent of these holdings, at
any rate, the vendor is discriminated against by the court's incompatible decisions under this lien statute. In view of this situation,
and irrespective of specific points discussed in the case, the following language from the dissenting opinion in the Wheaton v. Berg
case seems apropos:
"This construction (that all vendors be excepted from the operation of Sec. 5) is in harmony with the general policy of the section, as indicated by the exception of mortgagees and lessors from
the operation of its provisions."
Judge Mitchell expressly refrained from committing himself on
the other points in the rest of the opinion. This may be taken to
signify a reservation on his part as to the soundness of the conclusions in respect of the section of the lien law now under consideration. If so, there would seem to be substantial reasons for it.
In considering this section again, in Congdon v. Cook,27 the
court casts aside all considerations of "implied limitations" upon
the section although recognizing the limited prima facie character
of the presumption of the statute asserted in Wheaton v. Berg.
Here, however, the court justifies this statute by citing a Wisconsin decision,'" although the Wisconsin statute bases a lien on
both "knowledge" and "consent," and contains no arbitrary provision as to the character of the notice of non-assent, or the time
23.
423.

Botsford Lumber Co. v. Schriver, (1925) 49 S. D. 68, 206 N. W.

24. Abbott v. Modestad, (1898) 74 Minn.293, 77 N. W. 227.
25. Shove v. Burkholder Lumber Co.. (1923) 154 Minn. 137, 191 N. W.
397; Brooks v. Thorne, (1929) 176 Minn. 188, 222 N. W. 916.
26. U. S. Installment Realty Co. v. De Lancy Co., (1922) 152 Minn.78,
188 N. W. 212.
27. (1893) 55 Minn. 1, 56 N. W. 253.
28. Heath v. Salles, (1888) 73 Wis. 222, 40 N. W. 804.
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and manner of serving it. Having acknowledged that consent to
the lien is basically necessary, the court goes on to speak of "consent" to the improvement, wholly indifferent to the fact that the
statute does not purport to make "consent," as such, a ground for
a lien. Instead, the section specifically uses the word "authorized."
The Minnesota court says:
"The evidence of his consent is the failure of the owner, after
he acquires knowledge of the improvement, to give or post the
notice required by the statute." (Cites Wheaton v. Berg, and
refers to the construction of the statute in that case.)
"It is enough that the statute is a valid exercise of legislative
power, and the legal basis of the lien as against the owner is his
consent to an improvement presumably beneficial to the property."
(Italics supplied.)
"The evidence justified the court in finding the plaintiff had
reasonable knowledge of the improvement, and it was his duty to
give the required notice, or show a valid excuse, which he failed
to do." (But the court may well have added, "and which, under the
language of the statute, he was not permitted to do.")
Likewise, in Hurlburt v. New Ulm Basket Works2 9 the court,
in reasserting the validity of this section, fails to examine the
statute further; being content to refer to the fact that similar statutes
then existed in California, Oregon, Nevada, New Mexico and
Washington. In this New Ulm Basket case, the court, moreover
(on the excuse that the point had not sufficiently been advanced),
refrained from considering whether or not an agreement, express
or implied, was necessary to support a lien; and held that under
Sec. 5, knowledge alone on the part of an owner was sufficient to
support a lien.
In Wallinder v. Weiss3 0 the Minnesota court in comparing Sec.
1, Laws 1889, with the same section in the subsequently revised
law, concludes that there is no change in meaning as to the "right
to a lien." The court goes on to observe (what it failed to notice
in Congdon v. Cook, supra):
"The foundation of this right (to a lien) as therein indicated
(said Sec. 1) must be kept in mind in giving the proper meaning to
the word 'authorized,' as found in said Sec. 3509 (Sec. 8495
Mason's Minn. Stats. 1927; Sec. 514.06, Minn. Stats. 1945)....
"We take it that 'authorized' here means authorized by contract with, or by direction or at the instance of, the owner or person interested, and not merely by his permission or consent at the
instance of a tenant or vendee. * * * Such mere consent ought not
to irrevocably subject the interest of the owner to mechanic's liens
29. (1891) 47 Minn. 81, 49 N. W. 521.
30. (1912) 119 Minn. 412, 138 N. W. 417.
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for work or material performed or furnished at the instance of a
lessee or vendee."
This clear distinction, thus drawn, between what amounts to a
contract, express or implied, and mere assent, permission or license
seems sound; and leaves no doubt except as to the sufficiency of
mere assent as a ground for a lien, and as to the court's conception
of the meaning of "consent." The proposition is re-stated thus in
Bergund & Peterson v. Wright :1
"... to 'authorize' then, means something more than merely
giving permission to make them. It means an affirmative grant of
the right to make them." (Italics supplied.)
32
This is as if to explain what the court meant in a previous case
where it had said:
"As that section is construed by this court, knowledge by the
owner, and failure to serve notice, is evidence of his consent that
his land be charged with the claims of persons doing work or furnishing material in constructing a building upon it." (Italics supplied.)
In Snell Sash & Door Co. v. Florshehm,33 the latest case, the
Minnesota court points out that the statute calls for the giving of
notice "within five days after knowledge * * * that the improvement
is being made," and concludes:
"Thus the vendor (owner) here is precluded by a statutory
provision from showing any reason it may have had for not serving
or posting the statutory notices. The statute has no exceptions."
Bergund & Peterson v. Abram, 34 and Bruer Lbr. Co. v. Kenyon, 5
are cited. The Berglund case simply reiterates the "duty" of owners
to warn materialmen, etc., imposed by statute, as first expounded
in Wheaton v. Berg.30 The Bruer case restates generally the purported effect of the statute, that is, a lien resulting where such
notice is lacking, present the owner's knowledge. The effect of the
opinion in the Florsheii case is obviously to nullify the "prima
facie" character of the statute contended for in Wheaton v. Berg.
By way of recapitulation, from the cases discussed up to this
point, it will be observed that the Minnesota court has characterized the nature, purpose and effect of this section of the lien statute,
as follows:
1. It is a rule of evidence.
2. It is in the nature of an equitable estoppel.
31. (1921) 148 Minn. 412, 182 N. W. 624.
32. Sandberg v. Palm, (1893) 53 Mim. 252, 54 N. W. 1109.
33. (1944) 217 Minn. 21, 13 N. W. 2d 776.
34. (1921) 148 Minn. 412, 182 N. W. 624.
35. (1926) 166 Minn. 357, 208 N. W. 10.
36. (1892) 50 Minn. 525, 53 N. W. 926.
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3. It imposes upon the land owner the "duty" of "warning"
workmen, etc., by serving or posting a specified notice, during a specified time, if he would avoid the conclusive inference of the statute.
4. It is intended as a protection to laborers and materialmen,
and to make such protection more certain and effective.
5. It is intended to remove grounds for controversy.
Nowhere, however, does the court appear to have scrutinized or
analyzed this section from the standpoint of (a) vagueness or
unsoundness which may inhere in it; or (b) the arbitrary nature
of its provisions--except to the limited extent touched upon in
Wheaton v. Berg, supra; or (c) any oppressive, unreasonable or
unjust aspects of its nature and operation.
Similar statutes of other states have been sustained on similar
obreasoning without adequate consideration of the constitutional
37
statute.
the
against
urged
be
well
might
jections which
OBJECTIONS TO THE STATUTE

Common experience would indicate that serving notice on
prospective lien claimants prior to the commencement of the improvement, should be sufficient to protect their interests. Also, it
would certainly seem competent to post the premises with the required notice prior to the commencement. Not until Snell Sash &
Door v. Florsheinz has the court indicated specifically that this
is not a compliance. It follows from the court's view, that a prospective lien claimant is never burdened with any kind of notice, actual
or constructive, of an owner's non-consent, prior to the actual
commencement of the improvement; nor will any kind of notice
during the course of the improvement, no matter how effectual,
take the place of the arbitrary prescriptions of the statute. Thus, by
mere implication, a substantial body of law as to notice, based upon
common sense, is revoked as to prospective lienors.
Then, again, is an owner required to serve or post notice when
"knowledge" comes to an owner after the improvement has been
completed? The court has not been clear on this point at any time
37. New Mexico and Oregon courts sustained the statute as a rule of
evidence, while the California court sustained it on the basis of equitable
estoppel. Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Montevista Co., (1934) 39 N. Mex.
6, 38 P. 2d 77; Title Guarantee Co. v. Wrenn, (1899) 35 Ore. 73, 54 P.
1093; John R. Gentle & Co. v. Britton, (1910) 158 Cal. 328, 111 P. 9. Without
indicating its theory, the Nevada court applied its statute strictly and ruled
that personal service of notice upon the claimant will not bar the lien because
the statute requires the notice to be posted. Rosina v. Trowbridge, (1888)
20 Nev. 106, 17 P. 751.
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(except as it may be inferred from the Florsheim case) ; although
reason, based on common experience, would again say that it should
be unnecessary. Next, what of the duty of serving notice when an
owner first acquires knowledge of the improvement, within, say,
one to five days before the actual completion of the improvement?
You are left to your own deductions in such case also. In looking
at the statute from the viewpoint of the mechanic lien claimant,
who evidently is intended to be the beneficiary of the act; note that
he may complete the improvement without the owner's knowledge,
or he may have nearly completed it, and then be served with an
owner's notice of non-assent. In either case, is the statute very
helpful to him? Questions of this nature do not bespeak the clarity
and certainty of valid legislation, and should stimulate inquiry into
the question of constitutionality."
As noted, the court regards the section as imposing a "duty"
upon an owner to "warn" materialmen, etc., if he would escape
the inference of "consent." Statutes in other jurisdictions expressly basing liens upon "consent" of an owner to the improvement,
contain no arbitrary prescriptions for the form, time and manner
of giving of notice of dissent. Furthermore there is nothing in common experience which dictates the necessity of an owner waiting
until improvements actually commence before giving such notice.
The salutary purpose of this statute would be in most cases better
served if the notice were given prior to commencement of the improvement-for in such case, if the prospective claimant could ever
be said to have the right to rely on consent of some party interested
in the premises, with whom he has had no dealings, it would be
decidedly to his advantage to know it before expending time, energy
and money on the project. Ergo, the suggestion that the time, manner and form of giving notice under the statute is unduly arbitrary,
and that the courts consequently would not be obliged to enforce
the statute as a rule of evidence. People v. Murguria, 6 Cal. 2nd
115. And, as defined by the court, does the statute operate justly
and in a reasonable manner? If not, it must be objectionable on
these grounds too. Is it reasonable or just to require a by-standing
owner to abide the event of invasion of his property by strangers
before he can effectively apprise them that he is not a party to the
instigation of the improvement? They already know, or ought to
know, at whose instance they are there. If they propose to take
someone's property, is it not more just that they give notice to
38. See Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court of State of Cali-

fornia, (1931) 284 U. S. 8.
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him of such intention? On the other hand, what is the protectionto say nothing of the certainty thereof-to one who is served with
notice about the time his contribution is complete? These considerations are but other phases of another fundamental concept propounded by the court itself, namely: that of this statute as a rule of
evidence.
Is the statute valid, in fact, as a rule of evidence? The fact that
it operates to take an owner's property makes this inquiry highly
pertinent. Obviously, the statute creates a conclusive presumption.
It purports to establish the fact that an owner "authorized" an
improvement, by the exclusive evidence that the owner (1) knows
about it, and (2) serves or posts no notice in the prescribedmanner,
form and time. The severity of such rule is emphasized by the repudiation in Snell Sash & Door Co. v. Florsheimn of the limited
defense contended for in Wheaton v. Berg. So far as the statute
itself is concerned, it makes no express provision for any exception affording an owner the opportunity to show any excuse, on
any ground, for failure to serve or post the notice. The defense
of impossibility of compliance was plainly read into the statute
by the court in Wheaton v. Berg. But, in holding the presumption
under the statute prima facie only for the purpose of showing such
excuse, the court took an illogical and untenable position. By the
express wording of the statute, it is conclusive for all purposes.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court said, in Rogers-Ruger Co. v.
Murray39 regarding a lien statute: "This Court can only construe.
It can't legislate. Words should not be read into or read out of a
plain statute."
It is evident that the court, in approving the conclusive presumption created by the statute, has ignored the substitution of an arbitrary legislative prescription for certain essential evidence upon
which the conclusion or deduction depends. The statute bluntly
states that when improvements are going on, all persons interested
in the land (with certain exceptions) shall be deemed to have
"authorized" the improvement. Standing by itself-this is obviously ridiculous. It means simply that proof of the improvement is
proof that owners contracted for. it. So, by what follows, the fact
of "knowledge" is added to the required proof. Then it seeks to
leave a way out for an owner who has not in fact authorized the
improvenwnt, by his serving or posting of notice to the effect that
the improvement is not inade at his "instance." The court, however,
39.

(1902) 115 Wis. 267. 91 N. W. 657.
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instead of weighing the significance of the words "authorized" and
"instance," simply accepts the premise, namely: knowledge of the
improvement and absence of the prescribed notice by the owner
give rise to the unwarranted conclusion that the owner consented,
not only to the improvement, but also to a lien on his interest for
the same. In fact, the conclusion is even broader. It includes "request" of the owner, because to "authorize" requires some positive and active behavior on the part of an owner inducing the doing
of the improvement. The two quoted words-"authorized" and
"instance"--were manifestly used by the legislature with the object
of placing the party having a part interest in the land (but having
nothing to do with the procuring of the improvement) on the same
basis as the person actually authorizing the improvement. Presumably in this way the legislature sought to give the appearance
of equal protection of the law to several persons interested in the
same land. As we have seen, it is the authorization of the improvement, and the consequent express or implied contract, which draws
to it the statute; and in that manner confers the necessary consent
for the encumbrance on the interest of the instigator of the improvement. But the conclusive presumption of this law subjects an
owner, on the basis of only knowledge of the improvement, and
his failure to give the notice (two negative or passive factors), to
the same consequence as one who has "authorized" the improvement; and attempts thereby to draw in his consent to the lien of
the statute.
Under the express provisions of the Minnesota statute creating
mechanic's liens, and the theory applicable thereto, certain facts
must be present: (a) Real estate to be improved; (b) authorization or request by an owner; (c) directed to the contributor; (d)
actual improvement (adding of value); and (e) consent of the
owner to the lien for the added value, which results from the implied contract arising out of fact (b). But under the section under
consideration, "authorization" is conclusively proven by two facts:
Knowledge or notice of the owner (though merely a by-stander,
or objector, in fact) ; and, absence of notice of non-assent-which
by almost unanimous authority is not even enough to establish
"consent," to say naught of "authorization." Yet, notwithstanding,
fact (b) is deemed proven. By the same token, such owner is precluded from showing facts proving actual absence of any procurement on his part, of the improvement, or proving factual and effective objection to the improvement-to say nothing of the encumbrance-except in the arbitrarily prescribed manner. Nor, indeed,
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is there provision for proving impossibility of an owner's compliance with the section.
' Thus, it appears that additionalevidentiary facts bearing upon
the presence or absence of "authorization," on which consent to the
lien by an owner depends, are completely shunted and, indeed,
are precluded from consideration wherever the court has dealt with
this statute as a rule of evidence-(except to the limited extent discussed in Wheaton v. Berg, supra).
When it comes to the taking of property, the pertinent constitutional provisions must prevail in judging whether or not a statutory presumption is a valid rule of evidence. On this point the
U. S. Supreme Court has spoken. In Mobile, J.& K. RR. Co. v.
Turnipseed, Adiur.,40 that Court said:

"Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is but to enact a rule
of evidence, and quite within the general power of the government.
Statutes, national and state, dealing with such methods of proof in
both civil and criminal cases abound, and the decisions upholding
them are numerous [citing cases] ...
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of
another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a
denial of the equal protection of the law it is only essential that
there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact
from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a pu- y
arbitrary mandate. So, also, it must not, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the party
from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus presented."
"If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself prescribing
a rule of evidence, in either criminal or civil cases, does not shut out
from the party affected a reasonable opportunity to submit to the
jury in his defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue, there is
no ground for holding that due process of law has been denied
him." (Italics supplied.)
It seems therefore, (as if my way of confession and avoidance
of the foregoing rule) that the Minnesota court in sustaining the
statute, has drawn upon two unwarranted fictions: one relating to
a "duty" of an owner; the other, relating to a supposed analogy
between the statute and "an equitable estoppel." To speak of a
"duty" of such owner to "warn" prospective lien claimants is simply begging the question. No duty arises under a law if it is invalid. But the theory of "duty" may have been intended to supplant, if not to reinforce, the concept of a rule of evidence. This
40.

(1910) 219 Ti. S. 35, at 42.

1948]

IMPLIED CONSENT TO MECHANICS' LIEN

recalls the concept of quasi-contract, the application of which is a
judicial and not a legislative function. By the introduction of this
definition, the legislative branch is again conceded powers to legislate in the realm of "due process." If any duty arises in a situation
aimed at by the statute, it ought, in any event, to devolve upon the
one who seeks to take the owner's property, to give notice of his
intention so to do. Silence of the owner thereafter may then have
some significance. The limitations upon a legislature by the constitution proscribe arbitrary definitions:
"If the law making power were vested with unlimited authority
to fix the meaning of words, to take cases without the prohibition of
the constitution by arbitrary definitions, the fundamental rights
of the citizen would be safe only so long as the legislature should
abstain from defining away constitutional protections. Due process
of law might be defined to embrace arbitrary confiscations; * * * and
many, if not all of the barriers erected to shield the fundamental
. . . would crumble
rights of the citizen from legislative assault
' 41
before the breath of legislative definition."

This principle could of course be nullified, by unrestrained judicial
definition, as appears to be the case here.
The real question is: just what are the minimum specifications
of the vehicle for consent to the encumbrance (lien) ? From observations to this point, it is plain that "consent" to the improvement is the lowest common denominator of the grounds for liens
c -narily specified in lien laws, capable of the implication of consent to a lien. Unless there is at least such consent, no logical ground
for consent to a lien for work done or materials furnished can be
ptrc:eived. It is seen from what courts have said in defining "consent" as a ground for liens, that all have taken precautions against
a definition short of real consent, as against imputed consent. On
the other hand, will it do for the legislature as a matter of substantive law to prescribe a "duty," the neglect of which supplies
,'consent" and a promise to pay; or, instead thereof, some obligation
to another to respond with his own property, without reference
to his consent?
The fiction of a quasi or constructive contract is one relating
to procedure and remedy, to prevent or rectify what in reason and
justice would be a wrong. The "duty" in such case is positive. The
right corresponding to the duty is unqualified, unconditional, and
as apparent as the duty. The fiction is applied by the courts in
order to recover property, or its equivalent, which in reason and
justice does not belong to the obligor. He comes by it in violation
41. Yeatman v. King, (1892) 2 N. D. 421, 51 N. W. 721.
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of the rights of another. This is unjust enrichment. Under the
statute in question, however, a stranger or trespasser is given the
right to assume consent, by an owner, to the entry, and to the
doing of something, until notified to the contrary as prescribed,
without ever consulting the owner. This right and correlative "duty"
are in effect made superior to fundamental law by which one is
supposed to have protection against the taking of his property
against his will, except through due process. Thereby is defeated
that reasoning which irrefutably evinces that mere knowledge, plus
silence on the part of one, does not necessarily mean his consent
to an act. Thereby is frustrated that sense of justice which dictates
that one who, as a stranger, proceeds with an act without another's
consent, is not in position, on that premise alone, to insist upon
payment. An owner, for instance, having knowledge of an intended
improvement, at such time makes known his dissent. The statute,
as interpreted, practically requires the owner in such case, to stand
guard in order that notice may be given within its arbitrary prescriptions-for only too often has the court treated such prior information (either with or without dissent) as evidence of "knowledge" of an owner of the improvement.
Whatever the interpretations or definitions have been, the statute
here is clearly a mandate to find from proof of an undefined "knowledge" of the improvement by an owner, plus absence of arbitrarily
prescribed notice by him to the contributor, that the improvement
was procured in each and every case by (in the words of the court)
"contract with, or by direction or at the instance of the owner or
person interested." The words of the general provisions of the
statute specifying grounds for liens, make real consent to the improvement mandatory; but under the specifications of proof in the
statute considered, the dice are loaded as against the owner. This
question of "duty" is most aptly treated and disposed of in People.
ex rel. Hillel Lodge v.Rose. 42 An Illinois statute, in substance briefly
stated, imposed on every corporation the duty to file with the Secretary of State an annual statement showing, among other things,
the continued exercise of its charter. Upon failure to so do, the
Secretary of State was obligated to file a certificate forfeiting the
charter of any such corporation. While such failure was a breach
of the statutory duty and made prima facie evidence of non-user,
it was held that the legislature had no power or right to declare a
forfeiture of the corporation charter, or delegate such function to
the Secretary of State, because the forfeiture (being the "taking
42.

(1904) 207 Ill. 352, 69 N. E. 762.
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of property") is for the judiciary, whose functions may not be
usurped through any conclusive presumption of forfeiture. The
Court says: "It is not, however, within the legislative power to
declare what shall be conclusive evidence, as that would be an
invasion of the power of the judiciary" (citing authorities). The
dissenting opinion by Magruder, J., is based on an older sfatute
thought to be relevant but unconstitutional, and is illuminating on
the subject of "due process," and on that score is in harmony with
the majority opinion.
Substantial equity is readily possible under the statutes without
the questionable section-witness the great majority of state statutes
in which this provision is absent, and also the following from the
43
opinion of the Minnesota court in the case of Althen v. Tarbox
wherein the court said:
"It is not a case where work and labor have been performed or
materials furnished with the mere knowledge of the owner of the
land, in which case, and by reason of this knowledge alone, the
statute declares that such work and such materials shall be held to
have been done and furnished at his instance-that is, on his application, or at his solicitation; but it is a case wherein it clearly appears that the lien claimant has acted with the assent of the landowner, she having full knowledge of his acts as they were performed. Her authority * * * and consent * **

is so obvious as to

come under the 1st section of the lien act."
Innumerable situations may exist under which a part owner of
the land being improved ought not be subjected to the conclusive
presumption of the statute, despite his knowledge and non-service
of notice. The improvement may have been authorized with a distinct understanding with one part owner that he is to be saved
harmless, and that other owners are to pay for the improvement.
There may be an understanding that no improvements shall be
made, so far as any one part owner is concerned. There may have
been an understanding between the suppliers of the improvement
and all owners that the improvement be of a limited or certain
character and cost. The part owner sought to be charged may have
previously objected, not only to the other owners, but to the suppliers of the improvement. The owner sought to be charged may
have been deceived as to the character of the improvement and the
extent thereof. Many other instances can doubtless be advanced,
but the owner to be charged, though honestly failing to serve
notice, is precluded from showing his defense by the conclusiveness
of the presumption. In some instances-as logically follows from
43. (1892) 48 Minn. 18, 50 N. W. 1018.
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the Turnipseed case-even though the facts proven are by the
statute declared to be only prima facie evidence of the ultimate
fact, a statute will be held invalid under the due process clauses
if the inference does not have a rational connection with the proof.
Thus, the legislature is recognized as having the power to legislate
on the matter of rules of evidence, shifting the burden of proof, or
making certain facts prima facie evidence of other facts; but legislating rules of evidence which are arbitrary, oppressive or unjust,
or which operate in lieu of proof of facts to deprive one of life,
liberty or property, constitute legislative invasion of the judiciary.
While the Statute may resemble an equitable estoppel, this
ought not to be permitted to obscure the fact that the elements of
this "tailor-made" estoppel fall considerably short of the conditions of an equitable estoppel. It is conceivable that an owner by his
conduct or silence may have estopped himself from asserting that
he has not requested an improvement and thereby become personally liable for value of contributions. In such case, whether estoppel
is or is not a favorite of the law, a full disclosure of all of the facts
are indicated. Liability so established through "due process,"
would support a lien under the general provisions of the Statute.
Would equitable principles themselves support a lien in absence
of statute? To view the Statute as an estoppel is but to assume in
every case the nula fides of the owner and the reliance thereon by
every contributorwithout any evidence pro or con. Once the gates
are open, why not assume "knowledge"? In any case he received
the benefit of the presumed improvement.
Where the Minnesota court casually refers to this section of
the lien statute in John Martin Lumber Co. v. Howard.4 as being
"in the nature of an equitable estoppel," the Supreme Court of
California adopts this concept as the fundamental principle underlying and justifying such a statute. In Fuquay v. Steckney 45 one
Justice, speaking for the court, simply says: "I think the power of
the legislature to enact this provision is not only free from doubt
but the justice and wisdom of the measure are obvious." But in
John R. Gentle & Co. v. Britton,4" the court goes on to explain:
"The doctrine upon which 1192 of the code of, Civil Procedure
rests is that of estoppel which is indeed the underlying principle
of the entire theory of the mechanic's lien. The owner of real
property having, either by his own act or that of another with his
consent or knowledge, procured the improvement of such property.
44.
45.

46.

(1892) 49 Minn. 404, 52 N. W. 34.
(1871) 41 Cal. 583.

(1910) 158 Cal. 328, 111 P. 9.
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and received the benefits of the labor or material of another thereby,
is deemed to have created an equitable lien upon the premises to secure the payment of the value of such labor and materials. He is
like the owner of property who stands knowingly and silently by
and sees another person sell such property to an innocent purchaser
who believes the seller to be the owner and so believing parts with
value for it." (Italics are supplied.)
The above quotation again illustrates how this statute bedevils
the juridical mind. There is no differentiation between "knowledge,"
"assent," "consent," and "procuring," which in that order are respectively more inclusive. These words are treated as practically
synonyrihous. Further. the word "held" or "deemed" are used
without conscious regard for their implications of conclusiveness
in all possible circumstances.
The subtlety of the court's own self-deception, instead of illuminating the statute, veils its mischievous nature. What the court
says is that an owner, having procured an improvement and received the benefits thereof, has created an equitable lien on the
property (aside from Statute) and that mere knowledge of the
improvement, as well as consent to it, is a means of "procuring."
By such loose language there is imparted to the statute a color of
equitableness and a resemblance to an equitable estoppel. If, however, an equitable estoppel is to be ground for a lien, by what
authority does a legislature pretend to redefine and modify it?
The analogy of the "innocent" purchaser is misleading. It is a
statement of all of the conditions, facts and surrounding circumstances in that instance without relation to any statute. In the
analogy of the court, the true owner knows that the purported owner
is misrepresentinga material fact, and that the buyer is being misled into a situation for the worse. But under the court's explanation of the lien statute, this state of facts in respect of an owner,
or particularly a part owner, is purely and simply assumed. It may
be completely fictitious. On the other hand the "contributor" may
verify from the records or otherwise, the state of title. Further,
either with or without such verification, or further inquiry, he may
be willing to take the risk that (1) other owners whom he has not
consulted, may come into knowledge of his contributing and give
statutory notice of non-responsibility, or (2) that they may not
know of it until after his contribution is complete, or until toward
the end of his contribution when notice of non-responsibility may
be given. He thereby is merely gambling that other interested parties
will obtain the necessary "knowledge" and will neglect the giving
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of notice. In what sense is such a one the victim of a conspiracy
of silence, except by fiat of the legislature? On the other hand,
proof of all the facts by which the non-contracting owner might
establish his "innocence" (1) of representations by any contracting
party interested in the land, or (2) of "reliance" thereon by the
"contributor" is in fact denied him, save the artificial substitute
created by the statute. The fact is, however, that the elements of
an estoppel are not contemplated in or by the statute. Is that what
the court seems to recognize in Fred A. Krenwinkel et al. v. Jane
Louise Henne,47 where it is said that Sec. 1192 Code Civil Procedure "puts a non-contracting owner in the position of a 15arty to
the contract" (for the improvement). See 22 Cal. Law Rev. 315.
Then, in Lorenz v. Rousseau,48 the confession is made that "it is
well settled that estoppel is not favored and must clearly be proved."
CONCLUSION

Summarizing the salient points made by the courts in defense
of the Statute, in the light of the discussion thus far, the following
propositions become the inevitable logical result :-1. As a rule of evidence, the statute expressly prescribes that
the fact "authorization" by an owner, of the doing or furnishing
of an improvement by another, shall be conclusively proven by
(a) the owner's (undefined) "knowledge" of the improvement,
plus only (b) absence of the prescribed notice. This proof does not,
in fact, compel the conclusion; nor does it furnish even a rational
basis for the conclusion.
2. As an estoppel, the Statute serves in lieu of evidence to supply facts without which an equitable estoppel would not lie; and
deprives the owner of his right to contest such facts or to show
that they are fictitious.
3. As prescribing a "duty," the Statute is said to imply an obligation the breach of which is in effect the equivalent of the commission of a positive wrong, or the impairment of another's rights.
This, of course, is merely a fiction. The Statute saddles the owner
with a presumption and affords him one sole means of rebutting it.
In either case the legislature is assuming judicial functions.
4. There is nothing in the entire lien statute granting any lien
on the basis of an owner's "consent" to an improvement. All specified grounds are those equivalent to the "request" by the owner.

47. (1919) 42 Cal. App. 580, 183 P. 957.
48.

(1927) 85 Cal. App. 1, 258 P. 690.

19481

IMPLIED CONSENT TO MECHANICS' LIEN

"Consent" is included in "request" but the two have different legal
implications; and, unless uniformly applied, result in discrimination under "equal protection of the law" clauses.
5. "Consent" imposes upon an owner a purely presumptive
obligation to pay, which is readily rebuttable; and, when made a
ground for a lien by statute, is the weakest of all permissible
grounds. Without at least the "consent" of an owner, a lien claimant
has no rational basis for implying the owner's consent to the encumbrance.
6. Evidence sufficient to prove "authorization" of an improvement by an owner establishes a contract with the necessary incident
of the owner's personal liability for the value of the improvement.
The Statute recognizes that the personal liability supports the lien,
but contradicts itself by allowing a lien without proof of personal
liability.
7. Elimination of "controversy" is the result of unlawfully restricting an owner's defense.
S. The protection to a lienor under this Statute is certain only
when the presumption is operative under its provision. There is
no certain protection otherwise. A lienor, invoking this statute only,
is not entitled to the protection of a lien, as a matter of fact.
In short, real consent, and even a contract, is presumed from
mere notice and silence, from which in turn is presumed a consent
to the encumbrance-all of which is purely fictitious.
Notwithstanding the court's position on this Statute, it has
nevertheless recognized the evil of other statutes to which the
rules springing from the "due process clauses" and "equal protection" clause apply. 49 In a recent case the Minnesota court has issued
an exemplary opinion invalidating a presumptive statute of Minnesota.50 Since the precise question did not involve a conclusive
statutory presumption, but a rebuttable one, it is helpful only indirectly-but the principle of the foregoing cases is acknowledged.
As has been noted, consent is by some statutes made a foundation for a lien in addition to language indicating contract, express
or implied. The word "consent" as so used then becomes a fact
question to be determined, the same as the questions of fact which
determine whether or not a contract, express or implied, exists49. See Blue Earth County v. Nafl Security Co., (1925) 164 Minn.
390, 205 N. W. 277; Juster Bros., Inc. v. Christgau, (1943) 214 Minn. 108,

,7 N. W. 2d 501.

50. State v. Kelly, (1944) 218 Minn. 247, 15 N. W. 2d 554.
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for example: the mechanic lien statutes of North Dakota, Wisconsin and New York. In addition, we may find a provision for establishing such "consent" by presumption; as in North Dakota, Sec.
6237, R. C. 1905, which provides, in part:
"The owner shall be presumed to have consented to the doing
of any such labor or making of any such improvement if at the
time, he had knowledge thereof, and did not give notice of his
objection thereto to the person entitled to the lien."
Clearly the presumption in this statute does not purport to be
conclusive, and is at least entitled to be classed as a rule of evidence
because the facts to be proven would appear to be only prinm facie
evidence of the consent to the improvement. However, notwithstanding the prima fade character of this presumption, the court
refused to apply it in Christiansonv. Hughes."' There the owner
(wife of the one at whose instance the material was furnished),
having expressed her objection to the improvement, to her husband;
and not knowing who furnished the material, nor having made any
attempt to serve any objection upon the materialman; was held not
to have "consented" so as to charge her property with the lien.
The evidence was insufficient for such purpose, there not being
present all facts that "would create an equitable estoppel"; and
furthermore, "it would be a manifestly unreasonable construction
of the statute to require her (as owner) to seek out the prospective
lienor and serve upon him notice of her objection."
The great weight of authority points to the necessity of proving, as the foundation for a mechanic's lien, facts sufficient to establish (1) an express contract, (2) implied contract, (3) "consent
to the improvement," or (4) an equitable estoppel; and nothing
less; and the determination of the existence of any such ground is
a judicial and not a legislative function.
The original form of the Minnesota statute in question (herein
first quoted), required the restrainifig of the improvement as evidence of non-consent, but it must necessarily follow that an owner
could not do so unless he knew about it. The present statute gives
five days in which to disclaim liability by notice. Accordingly, the
principal difference lies in the degree with which dissent or nonassent is to be evidenced, plus the fact that under the oldest statute
permission for the improvement was also required to be withheld.
Under the old statute, however, the real fact in issue was the "consent" of the owner; whereas under the successor statute, it is the
"authorization" of the improvement by the owner. A failure to re51. (1909) 18 N. D. 282, 122 N. W. 384.
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strain, or a failure to give notice, in either case would result in
similar conclusive presumptions. Thus there exists a fundamental
similarity-elusive perhaps, but very real-between the old invalidated law and the present, notwithstanding that the court in Fauser
v. HcElroy52 said that the old statute was "entirely dissimilar."
It will be observed that in some decisions-in other jurisdictions
particularly-the general statement is made that the fundamental
basis of a lien is the adding of value to the land. Even the Minnesota court, as we have noted, indicates that this is "presumptively"
so. But were this all, it would seem unnecessary for courts to be so
effusive on the question of the foundation of liens. It would be mere
surplusage in any lien statute to mention "knowledge," "notice,"
etc., on the part of an owner; to say nothing of "consent," "instance," "request," "agreement," etc., of an owner. Further, although the "adding of value," in itself, as a ground for a lien,
might be predicated upon public welfare-while limited to private
persons and private property, in private transactions-and inhere
in the police powers, the fact that the granting of a lien is the taking
of an owner's property must be reckoned with, since the taking even
of "an essential attribute" of property under the police power is
prohibited.
The Supreme Court of the United States has nowhere sanctioned the basing of liens on anything short of a request or direction by the owner, or the consent of the owner. That is to say,
either the owner originates and motivates the doing of the improvement, and the prospective lienor accepts; or the such lienor proposes, and the owner accepts. In either case, the parties know that
the law enters into the subject. Now, it may be possible to view
the matter in the light that when one takes title to property, he takes
it subject to the law in question, of which he has knowledge. From
this it may be reasoned that if one does not like to be subject to
these provisions, one should never acquire property; and while
this may argue consonantly with constitutional restrictions upon
"impairment of contract," it obviously becomes an absurdity in
respect of "due process"-which intends the protection of the
ownership of property, rather than the discouragement of its
acquisition.
52. (1923) 157 Minn. 116, 195 N. W. 786.

